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Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in coun-
tries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration.
In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the
fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this
issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition
model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level
of border enforcement and the way it has to be nanced. We show that
an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an
advantage to win the election. In particular, in most of the cases we con-
sider we nd that rightist parties have an advantage to win in countries
where the relevant issue in election is illegal immigration. This result may
help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist
parties in several countries.
1 Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries
where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular
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we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are
either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that
we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over
which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it
has to be nanced. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic
behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. This result may help
us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in
several countries.1
The rst question that we have to address is: why the control of immigration
might be the relevant issue in elections?. In other words: why immigration is
important for the host countrys voters? Immigration has economic and non-
economic e¤ects in the host countrys society. Regarding the economic e¤ects,
there are empirical and theoretical papers that analyze the immigrations e¤ect
on nativeslabor market conditions.2 There are also other papers exploring the
scal e¤ects of immigration on the governmentsbudget and on the provision of
public goods.3 However, there are very few things said about non-economic ef-
fects of immigration in the host countrys society. In this context Mayda (2003)
looking at cross-country survey data nds evidence of a robust relationship be-
tween attitudes towards immigration and both security concern and cultural
and national identity issues. In this paper we focus on the e¤ect of immigration
on security concern in the host country i.e. we focus on how immigration af-
fects citizensperception about the lack of security and delinquency in the host
country.
Despite of the fact that immigration and delinquency may not be related,
in many countries, the society actually links immigration with delinquency. In
Europe, a survey requested by the European Commission points out that immi-
gration is spontaneously accused of being a major source of insecurity in most
EU-countries. An extreme example can be Greece in which a survey of the po-
lice shows that 92% of the surveyed population believed that the increase in the
crime rate over the 90s has been caused by immigrant criminality (see Karidis,
1For example, the National Front headed by Jean Marie Le Pen in France, Haiders Freedom
party in Austria, Fortuyns party in the Netherlands or Berlusconis party in Italy.
2See Borjas et al (1996)
3See Razin et al (2002)
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1998). Regarding the US, a poll (2000) shows that 70% of respondents thought
that immigrants are the cause of higher crime rates (see Cooper, 2003). On the
other hand, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the social con-
cern about insecurity rose in the US together with the societys fear of massive
immigration.
Together with the current rise of migration ows, illegal immigration is rising
very rapidly in some developed countries. In the US it is estimated that there
were 8 to 11 million of illegal immigrants in 2003. Some countries in Europe as
Italy, Greece and Spain are also receiving large numbers of illegal immigrants.
Regarding the link between illegal immigration and the social perception of
insecurity, there are a priori reasons to think that the link between illegal im-
migration and crime may be more real than the link between legal immigration
and crime. First, illegal immigration has turned into smuggling and tra¢ cking
of people as a lucrative business by international crime syndicates. Frequently,
those migrants are caught up in organized crime by these criminal gangs.4 Sec-
ond, in general illegal immigrants face worse labor market conditions therefore
they have a lower cost to switch to the crime sector. Empirical results on these
assertions are rare because of the di¢ culty to obtain data about illegal immigra-
tion. Nevertheless, Coronado and Orrenius (2003) nd that illegal immigration
through the US-Mexican border is not related with property crimes but there
is a signicant positive correlation with violent crimes.
In our model we assume that there exists a positive relation between the
number of illegal immigrants that enter the country and the nativesperception
of the lack of security in the host country. Therefore, the number of illegal
immigrants that enter the country a¤ects negatively citizensexpected utility.
Moreover, we assume that the e¤ects of illegal immigration on citizensutility
may be di¤erent for di¤erent citizens. Regarding this assumption, Mayda (2003)
nds empirical evidence that in developed countries unskilled workersattitudes
towards immigration are more negative than skilled ones. However, she nds
that the opposite is true for developing countries. In order to make the analysis
more general we do not consider any restriction about the relative intensity of
skilled and unskilled workersattitudes to immigration.
4See Budapest Group (1999).
3
Additionally, illegal immigration is becoming an important political issue in
many developed countries. An example of the increasing importance of illegal
immigration in the political agenda is the growth of the governmentsexpenses
devoted to deter it. For instance, the U.S. government has dramatically in-
creased the enforcement of the U.S border over the last two decades, raising
the enforcement budget of the U.S. Border Patrol from $290 million in 1980 to
$1.7 billion in 1998 (in 1998 dollars). Also the number of hours that Border
Patrol o¢ cers spent policing the Mexican border increased from 1.8 million in
1977 to 5.1 million in 1997. As a consequence of this increase of enforcement,
border apprehensions rose from 200.000 in 1970 to 1.5 million in 1999.5 The
European Union is also paying special attention to this issue as it was shown in
the European Council meeting in Seville.6
In our model we assume that there exists an exogenous potential mass of
illegal immigration that is willing to enter a country. The government of the
country may implement a level of border enforcement in order to try to deter
such illegal immigration from entering it. We can interpret the level of border
enforcement as the governments expenses devoted to external border protection
plus deportation costs. We assume that an increase in border enforcement would
decrease the number of illegal immigrants entering the country although at a
decreasing rate.
To nance border enforcement the government charges an ad valorem per-
sonal income tax on native workers. The Government may introduce a certain
level of progressivity in the tax scheme charging a lower ad valorem personal
income tax to low income workers than to high income ones. We assume that
the governments budget constrain has to be balanced.
We analyze the political outcome of a two party electoral competition model.
The choices of parties are the instruments described before: the level of border
enforcement and the progressivity of the tax scheme. We suppose that parties
are fully committed to implement the policy announced during the electoral
campaign. We show two di¤erent scenarios depending on whether parties are
5See Orrenius (2001) and Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001).
6The President of European Comission, presently Romano Prody, proposed to strengthen
the control of the external borders by developing the concept of an integrated and compre-
hensive border strategy for EU.
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opportunistic or ideological.
We nd that when parties are opportunistic, the unique equilibrium outcome
is that both parties win the election with the same probability and propose the
same pair of policies. These equilibrium policies will coincide with the optimal
policies for the median voter. Nevertheless, when parties are ideological the
political outcome in equilibrium is that a unique party surely wins the election
and the equilibrium policy implemented may be di¤erent from the optimal one
for the median voter. Therefore, ideology gives one party an advantage to win
the election.
Ideology of a party is dened in our model as a strong preference on one
policy instrument. In particular, when parties are ideological we consider two
possibilities: i) both partiesideology is determined by the progressivity on taxes
and ii) both partiesideology is determined by the level of border enforcement.
The rst case could be applied to countries in which illegal immigration becomes
an important issue very recently, and therefore, it can be supposed that parties
would not have an ideological position on this issue yet. The second case could
be applied to countries in which illegal immigration has been an important issue
for some time, and therefore, it can be supposed that parties would already have
an ideological position on this issue.
In this context, one of our main ndings is that, in the presence of par-
ties ideologically determined by the border enforcement, the more intense the
relationship between insecurity and illegal immigration is for skilled workers,
the more likely the most rightist party wins in developed countries (where the
median voter is skilled). Also, the higher the number of potential illegal immi-
grants is, the more likely the rightist party wins in developed countries. Both
results seem to be quite intuitive. We shall comment other results in the last
section of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we formally
describe the model. In Section 3 we analyze the properties of the votersindirect
utility functions with respect to the policy instruments. In Section 4 we focus on
the political competition considering di¤erent scenarios where political parties
are either opportunistic or ideological. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and
discus some results.
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2 The Model
Consider a country in which population is composed by native workers and
illegal immigrants. In our model the number and role played by legal immigrants
is negligible since we assume that they do not have a relevant e¤ect on social
insecurity and they cannot participate in elections.
2.1 Native workers
Native workers care about their private consumption and about the number of
illegal immigrants living in the country (I). We assume that illegal immigration
has a negative e¤ect on native workersexpected utility. This e¤ect is induced
by the nativesperception that illegal immigration rise delinquency and social
insecurity. Native workers expected utility function is assumed to take the
following functional form:
Ui(ci; I) = ci   iI, (1)
where ci is the consumption level of worker i and i 2 R+ a parameter which
measures the impact of illegal immigration on the utility of worker i.
Native workers receive an income or salary wi which, after paying taxes, is
spent fully in consumption. Hence, native workersbudget constraint can be
written as:
ci = (1  ti)wi i = u; s, (2)
where ti is the ad valorempersonal income tax imposed on worker i by the
government. We assume that salaries are exogenously determined.
For simplicity let assume that there are only two types of native workers:
skilled and unskilled, denoted by the subindex i = u; s. We assume that the
number of skilled and unskilled workers is S and U respectively. We also assume
that skilled workerswage is higher than unskilled workersone i.e. ws > wu.
2.2 Illegal Immigration
We assume that the amount of illegal immigration that enters the country de-
pends on the amount of immigration which is willing to reach illegally the coun-
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try and it also depends on the resources devoted by the government to border
enforcement. Suppose that there is a potential mass of immigrants that wants
to enter illegally the country (Y ) and that only a fraction of this mass actu-
ally enters (I  Y ). That restriction on the entry is costly for the government
which may spend a positive amount of money in border enforcing policy (E).
Thus, the number of illegal immigrants that enter the country can be written
as I(Y;E).
We assume that the number of illegal immigrants that enter the country
(I) decreases with the level of border enforcement (E), that is, IE(Y;E) < 0;
and it increases with the number of potential illegal immigrants (Y ), that is
IY (Y;E) > 0. We interpret IE(Y;E) as a measure of e¢ cacy of the border
enforcement policy. We assume decreasing rates of return of I with respect to the
level of border enforcement, i.e. IEE(Y;E) > 0. That is, e¢ cacy is decreasing on
the level of border enforcement. Moreover, we assume that IEY (Y;E) < 0, i.e.
e¢ cacy of border enforcement is increasing on the number of potential illegal
immigrants. Finally, we assume that if the government spends no money in
border enforcement all illegal immigrants will enter the country, i.e. I(Y; 0) = Y .
2.3 Governments budget constraint
The government uses taxes to fund the total resources spent in border enforce-
ment policy. We assume that the governments budget is always balanced, that
is,
E = tuUwu + tsSws (3)
Notice that all, workers in the same group (skilled or unskilled) receive the
same salary and pay the same personal income tax. However, workers belong-
ing to di¤erent groups obtain di¤erent salaries and may pay di¤erent personal
income tax. We assume that the government may propose a certain level of
progressivity in their tax schemes:
tu = ts  2 [0; 1] ; (4)
where  is the level of progressivity of the governments tax scheme. Notice
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that the tax scheme is more progressive as  is closer to 0 and conversely, when
it is equal to 1 we are in the case of a pure proportional tax scheme.
From the governments budget constraint we have that the level of border en-
forcement E o¤ered by the government is the following function of the personal
income tax imposed on skilled workers:
E = ts (Uwu + Sws) (5)
3 Indirect Utility functions
Our main goal is to obtain the policy outcome of political competition, regarding
the policy instruments. To do that we characterize the utility of the voters as a
function of the governments policy instruments: the level of border enforcement
E and the level of progressivity of the taxes .
3.1 Optimal E for a xed 
First, we compute the level of E that maximizes the utility function of each
type of voter (skilled or unskilled workers) for a given value of , subject to
the workers budget constraint. Since given a pair of values for E and , the
balanced GBC (governments budget constraint) denes a unique value for the
taxes, we need to consider the GBC as an additional feasibility constraint in the
maximization of the utility functions.
Thus, for a given , the optimal level of E for skilled workers is the solution
to the following problem.
8<: maxE cs   sI(Y;E)s.t. (2) and (5). (6)
Substituting both restrictions in the objective function the optimization
problem can be written as:
max
E
ws

1  E
Uwu + Sws

  sI (E; Y )
Solving for the rst order condition we obtain a condition on the marginal
e¤ect of E over illegal immigration I for skilled workers:
8
IE(Y;E

s ()) =
 ws
s (Uwu + Sws)
(7)
This equation denes the level of border enforcement that maximizes7 the
skilled workersutility (Es ) for a given value of .
Similarly, for a given , the optimal level of E for unskilled workers is the
solution to the following maximization problem:
8<: maxE cu   uI(Y;E)subject to (2) ,(4) and (5). (8)
Notice that substituting (5) in (4) we obtain:
tu =
E
Uwu + Sws
(9)
Substituting the restrictions in the objective function the optimization prob-
lem can be written as:
max
E
wu

1  E
Uwu + Sws

  uI (E; Y ) (10)
Solving for the rst order condition we obtain a condition on the marginal
e¤ect of E over illegal immigration I for unskilled workers:
IE(Y;E

u()) =
 wu
u (Uwu + Sws)
(11)
This equation denes the level of border enforcement that maximizes 8 un-
skilled workersutility (Eu()) for a given value of . Notice that for  = 0;
since IE(Y;E) < 0 for all E 2 R+; the FOC is not satised and therefore,
the optimal level of border enforcement for unskilled workers is the maximum
feasible level, that is Emax = Sws:
Comparing the di¤erent optimal levels of border enforcement for skilled and
unskilled workers we can state the following two propositions:
Proposition 1 Es () is increasing on  and E

u() is decreasing on 
7The Second Order Condition is also satised since:  sIEE(E; Y )  0 8s 2 R+
8The Second Order Condition is also satised since:  uIEE(E; Y )  0 8u 2 R+.
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Proof. To prove that Es () is increasing on  consider two di¤erent values
of 1 and 2 such that, 2  1: From the skilled workersFOC we have that
IE(Y;E) is an increasing function of : Hence, IE(Y;Es (2))  IE(Y;Es (1))
but since we assumed IEE(Y;E) > 0, this implies that Es (2)  Es (1). Thus,
Es () is increasing on :
To prove Eu() is decreasing on ; notice that by the same argument we
need to show that IE(Y;Eu(1))  IE(Y;Eu(2)). But this is true i¤:
1wu
u (1Uwu + Sws)
 2wu
u (2Uwu + Sws)
,
12Uwu + 1Sws  12Uwu + 2Sws
Which is equivalent to say that 1  2: Thus, it always holds and we obtain
that Eu() is decreasing on :
This proposition says that when there is a decrease on the progressivity of the
tax scheme skilled workers will prefer a higher level of border enforcement and
unskilled workers will prefer a lower one. If the tax is more proportional skilled
workers have to contribute less, in relative terms, in other words, E becomes
cheaper for skilled workers for more proportional tax schemes. Therefore, a
government that tries to obtain the vote of skilled workers will propose a lower
level of E for more progressive tax schemes. Similarly a government that tries
to obtain the vote of unskilled workers will propose a higher level of E for more
progressive tax schemes.
The next proposition shows that given a level of progressivity of the tax
scheme () unskilled workers will prefer a higher level of border enforcement
than skilled workers as long as the illegal immigration e¤ect on their utility is
high enough.
Proposition 2 Eu()  Es () i¤ us 
tu()wu
ts()ws
.
Proof. Since IEE(Y;E) > 0 we have that Eu()  Es () i¤ IE(Y;Eu()) 
IE(Y;E

s ()) which is equivalent to:
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 wu
u (Uwu + Sws)
  ws
s (Uwu + Sws)
,
u
s
 wu
ws

,
u
s
 t

s()wu
ts()ws
,
u
s
 t

u()wu
ts()ws
;
where ts() =
Es ()
Uwu+Sws
and tu() =
Eu()
Uwu+Sws
That is, given a level of progressivity of the tax scheme (), unskilled workers
prefer a higher E than skilled workers if and only if the marginal e¤ect of illegal
immigration on a workers utility relative to what she pay to deter such illegal
immigration is higher for an unskilled worker than for a skilled worker, i.e.
u
tuwu
 stsws :
Notice that if under a less progressive government (larger ) the optimal
border enforcement for unskilled workers is larger than for skilled workers it is
also true under a more progressive government (smaller ). This result can be
summarize in the following Corollary:
Corollary 1 If 2 > 1; Eu(2)  Es (2) =) Eu(1)  Es (1):
Given a xed value of , substituting the optimal level of border enforcement
in the utility function of each type of worker we obtain the workersmaximal
utility for each value of .
Us() = (1  ts(Es (); ))ws   sI (Y;Es ())
Uu() = (1  tu(Eu(); ))wu   uI (Y;Eu())
What is worker is welfare e¤ect due to a change in the progressivity of the
tax scheme assuming that the government is implementing her optimal level of
border enforcement? A change in  has two e¤ects on worker i0s utility:
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1. A tax e¤ect. A change in  implies a change in the ad valorem income
tax that the worker has to pay, and therefore in her consumption. Hence, the
tax effect of worker i is given by:
@ci
@
=  wi @t

i (E

i (); )
@
Notice that the change of the ad valorem income tax produced by a change
in  is given by:
dts(E

s (); )
d
=
dEs ()
d (Uwu + Sws)  UwuEs ()
(Uwu + Sws)
2
dtu(E

u(); )
d
=
dEu()
d  (Uwu + Sws) + SwsE

u()
(Uwu + Sws)
2
Since from Proposition 1 we know that:
dEs ()
d
> 0 and
dEu()
d
< 0;
we do not obtain specic signs for dt

s(E

s ();)
d and
dtu(E

u();)
d . Therefore,
we can only conclude that the tax e¤ect will be positive or negative, depending
on the value of . That is, assuming that the government will implement the
optimal level of border enforcement of skilled workers, a decrease of the level of
progressivity of the tax scheme leads them to choose a higher optimal level of
border enforcement. Depending on how intense will be such increase in border
enforcement with respect to  their personal income tax (ts) will increase or
decrease with : Similarly, if we assume that the government will implement the
unskilled workersoptimal level of border enforcement, their personal income tax
will increase or decrease with the level of progressivity of the tax scheme. It will
also depend on the intensity of such progressivity change over the optimal level
of border enforcement of unskilled workers.
2. An immigration e¤ect. A change in  implies a change in the optimal
level of border enforcement, and therefore, a change in the amount of illegal
immigrants that will enter the country.
Thus, the immigration e¤ect on worker i is given by:
 i
dI (Y;Ei ())
d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Since from Proposition 1 we know that:
dEs ()
d
> 0 and
dEu()
d
< 0;
we have that a decrease in the progressivity of the taxes (increase of )
implies a larger optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers and a
smaller one for unskilled workers. Since IE(Y;E) < 0 we obtain:
dI (Y;Es ())
d
= IE(Y;E

s ())
dEs ()
d
< 0
dI (Y;Eu())
d
= IE(Y;E

u())
dEu()
d
> 0
Hence, an increase of  will reduce the number of illegal immigrants that
enter the country if the optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers
is implemented. However it will increase the number of illegal immigrants if the
optimal level of border enforcement for unskilled workers is implemented.
Notice also that an increase on  will be positive for all workers (skilled
and unskilled) if the optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers is
implemented. However it will be negative for all workers if the optimal level of
border enforcement for unskilled workers is implemented.
When we sum up both e¤ects we obtain that an increase of  has an un-
ambiguous total e¤ect on worker is welfare assuming that the government is
implementing her optimal level of border enforcement. More precisely, if the gov-
ernment implements the optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers
an increase of  will make skilled workers better o¤. However, if the govern-
ment implements the optimal level of border enforcement for unskilled workers
an increase of  will reduce skilled workers welfare. This result is captured in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 dUs(E

s ();)
d > 0 and
dUu(E

u();)
d < 0:
Proof. Let T = Uwu + Sws. If the government implements the optimal
level of border enforcement for skilled workers we have that:
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dUs(E

s (); )
d
=  ws dts(E

s (); )
d
  s
dI (Y;Es ())
d
=  ws 1
T
dEs ()
d
+ ws
UwuE

s ()
T 2
  sIE(Y;Es ())
dEs ()
d
= ws
UwuE

s ()
T 2
 
ws
T
+ sIE(Y;E

s ())
 dEs ()
d
From the rst order condition of the skilled workersmaximization problem
we know that:
IE(Y;E

s ()) =
 ws
sT
Substituting in the previous expression we have:
dUs(E

s (); )
d
= ws
UwuE

s ()
T 2
> 0
Similarly, if the government implements the optimal level of border enforce-
ment for unskilled workers we have that:
dUu(E

u(); )
d
=  wu dtu(E

u(); )
d
  u
dI (Y;Eu())
d
=  wu

Eu() + 
dEu()
d

T   UwuEu()
T 2
 
uIE(Y;E

u())
dEu()
d
=
 wuEu()T
T 2
  wu
T
dEu()
d
+
Uw2uE

u()
T 2
+
u
wu
uT
dEu()
d
=
Eu()
T 2
  wuT + Uw2u
=
Eu()
T 2
  wu(Uwu + Sws) + Uw2u
Then we conclude that:
dUu(E

u(); )
d
=  E

u()
T 2
wuSws < 0
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3.2 Optimal  for a xed E
We now compute the level of  that maximizes the utility of each type of voters
for a given value of E.
We have that for a given value of E, the optimal level of  for skilled workers
is the solution to the following problem.
8<: max cs   sI(Y;E)subject to (2) and (5). (12)
Substituting both restrictions in the objective function the optimization
problem can be written as:
max

ws

1  E
Uwu + Sws

  sI (E; Y )
Notice that the FOC of this maximization problem is:
wsEUwu
(Uwu + Sws)
2  0
Thus, the optimal  for skilled workers is s(E) = 1 for all E > 0 and any
s(E) 2 [0; 1] for E = 0. This means that for all E > 0 skilled workers prefer a
pure proportional tax scheme.
Similarly, for a given value of E, the optimal level of  for unskilled workers
is the solution to the following maximization problem:
8<: max cu   uI(Y;E)subject to (2), (4) and (5). (13)
Notice that substituting (5) in (4) we obtain:
tu =
E
Uwu + Sws
Substituting the restrictions in the objective function the optimization prob-
lem can be written as:
max

wu

1  E
Uwu + Sws

  uI (E; Y )
Notice that the FOC of this maximization problem is:
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 wuESws
(Uwu + Sws)
2  0
Thus, the optimal  for unskilled workers is u(E) = 0 for all E > 0 and
any u(E) 2 [0; 1] for E = 0. This means that for all E > 0 unskilled workers
prefer do not pay taxes at all.
Given a xed value of E, substituting the optimal level of progressivity of the
tax scheme in the utility function of each type of worker we obtain the workers
maximal utility for each value of E.
Us(E) = (1  ts(E; 1))ws   sI (Y;E)
Uu() = (1  tu(E; 0))wu   uI (Y;E)
What is worker is welfare e¤ect due to a change in the border enforcement
assuming that the government is implementing her optimal level of progressivity
of the tax scheme? A change in E has two e¤ects on worker i0s utility:
1. A tax e¤ect. A change in E implies a change in the ad valorem income
tax that the worker has to pay, and therefore in her consumption. Hence, the
tax e¤ect of worker i is given by:
@ci
@
=  wi @t

i (E;

i )
@E
Notice that the change of the ad valorem income tax produced by a change
in E is given by:
dts(E; 1)
dE
=
1
Uwu + Sws
> 0
dtu(E; 0)
dE
= 0
In this case, if the optimal level of progressivity for skilled workers is im-
plemented, ( = 1) an increase in E will increase taxes and therefore lower
skilled workers consumption. However, if the optimal level of progressivity
for unskilled workers is implemented, ( = 0) it means that they do not pay
taxes and therefore a change in E wont have any e¤ect in unskilled workers
consumption.
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2. An immigration e¤ect. A change in E implies a change in the optimal
level of border enforcement, and therefore, a change in the amount of illegal
immigrants that will enter the country.
Thus, the immigration e¤ect on worker i is given by:
 i
dI(Y;E)
dE
< 0
When we sum up both e¤ects we obtain that an increase of E has an unam-
biguous total e¤ect on unskilled workerss welfare assuming that the government
is implementing her optimal level of progressivity of the tax scheme. More pre-
cisely, if the government implements the optimal level of progressivity of the
tax scheme for unskilled workers an increase of E will make unskilled workers
better o¤. In this case, unskilled workers will maximizes their utility with the
maximum level of E; i.e Emax = Sws. However, if the government implements
the optimal level of progressivity of the tax scheme for skilled workers an in-
crease of E has an ambiguous e¤ect on skilled workers welfare. Depending on
how intense is the immigration e¤ect with respect to the tax e¤ect we have a
gain or a loss in skilled workerswelfare.
4 Political competition
In the model described so far we have assumed that there exists a government
that in order to deter illegal immigration implements a level of border enforce-
ment (E). This border enforcement policy is funded by the revenues obtained
from a personal income tax over national workers (t) which, by means of the
level of progressivity of such tax scheme () may be di¤erent for skilled and
unskilled workers. Thus, the governments choices are represented by a triplet
(E; t; ) that satises the governments budget constraint. Notice that if the
governments budget constraint has to be satised, choosing only two of these
three variables determines a unique value for the third one. Without loss of
generality we assume that the level of border enforcement and the level of pro-
gressivity of the tax scheme (E;) are the choices of the government. Then, the
ad valorem tax will be given by the governments budget constraint for each
pair of values for E and .
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In this section we analyze the political competition before the government
is elected. We consider a model of two party competition. As we explained
above, partieschoices are represented by the level of border enforcement and
the level of progressivity of the tax scheme (Ej ; j). Thus, the policy space is
X = R+  [0; 1] :
We assume that every national worker votes for a party (there is no absten-
tion). Illegal immigrants have no right to vote9 . A national worker will vote for
the party whose proposal gives her a higher level of utility. That is, worker i
will vote for a party 1 if Ui(E1, 1) > Ui(E2, 2) and she will vote for party 2
if Ui(E2, 2) > Ui(E1, 1). In case of indi¤erence, a voter is assumed to vote
for each party with equal probability.
The game takes place in two stages. In the rst stage, parties propose a
certain policy in X. In the second stage each voter votes for the party whose
proposal would give him a higher utility. We assume that parties are fully
committed to their policy proposals. This means that the party that wins the
election has to implement the policy chosen in the rst stage.
The winner of the election is decided according to majority rule. In case
of a tie, both parties win with the same probability (equal to 12 ). We assume
that parties maximize the probability of winning. Thus, the payo¤ function of
a party can be dened as:
Vj(Ej ; j) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if #fv : Uv(Ej ; j) > Uv(Ek; k)g+ B2 > S+U2
1
2 if #fv : Uv(Ej ; j) > Uv(Ek; k)g+ B2 = S+U2
0 if #fv : Uv(Ej ; j) > Uv(Ek; k)g+ B2 < S+U2
where # fv : Uv(Ej ; j) > Uv(Ek; k)g is the number of voters who prefer to
vote for party j ( j 6= k) and B = # fv : Uv(Ej ; j) = Uv(Ek; k)g is the number
of voters that are indi¤erent between the two parties. So, if the number of voters
that prefer to vote for party j plus half of voters which are indi¤erent between
the two parties is larger than the half of total voters, party j will win the election.
We consider three di¤erent scenarios depending on the composition of the
partiesstrategy set. In the rst scenario, we assume that a party has to de-
9We also assume that legal immigrations have no right to vote. Thus only native workers
can vote.
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cide about both variables simultaneously. In this case a strategy is dened as
(Ej ; j) 2 X. Thus, in this scenario parties are purely opportunistic. In the
second scenario, we assume that the level of progressivity for each party is xed
and they cannot decide about it. Parties can decide only the level of border
enforcement. Thus, a strategy for a party j is Ej 2 R+. In this case, parties are
ideological with respect to the progressivity of the taxes. That is, parties want
to win the election in order to implement their favorite level of progressivity
of the tax scheme. Finally, in the third scenario, we assume that the level of
border enforcement for each party is xed and they can decide only the level of
progressivity of the tax scheme. Hence, a strategy for a party is j 2 [0; 1]. In
this case, parties are ideological with respect to the border enforcement policy.
That is, parties want to win the election in order to implement their favorite
border enforcement policy.
Since the behavior of the voters is unambiguous in this model, we dene
an equilibrium of the game only in terms of the strategies of the two parties
at the rst stage. Thus, in the rst game a pure strategy equilibrium is a
pair of values for the level of progressivity of the tax scheme and the level of
border enforcement for each party [(Ee1 ; 
e
1); (E
e
2 ; 
e
2)] such that both parties
are maximizing the probability of winning given the choices of the opponent.
In the second game, given 1 and 2 a pure strategy equilibrium is a pair of
values for the level of border enforcement [(Ee1(1; 2); E
e
2(1; 2)] such that
both parties are maximizing the probability of winning given the choice of the
opponent. Finally, in the third game, given E1 and E2 xed a pure strategy
equilibrium is a pair of values for the level of progressivity of the tax scheme
[e1(E1; E2); 
e
2(E1; E2)] such that both parties are maximizing the probability
of winning given the choice of the opponent.
4.1 Opportunistic parties
Suppose that parties are purely opportunistic, i.e., they choose both the level
of border enforcement and the progressivity of the tax scheme in order to win
the elections.
An important variable for political parties will be the number of skilled an
unskilled workers because the preferences of the median voter coincide with the
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preferences of the majority of the society.
If S > U the median voter will be skilled and, in order to maximize the
probability of winning, parties will try to obtain the vote of skilled workers.
Given a level of progressivity of the tax scheme , the largest utility that a
party can o¤er to a skilled worker is Us(Es (); ), that is, the skilled workers
utility when the government implements the optimal level of border enforcement
for skilled workers. Additionally, given a positive level of border enforcement
E, the maximum utility that a party can o¤er to a skilled worker is Us(E; 1);
that is, the skilled workersutility when the government implements the optimal
level of progressivity of the tax scheme for skilled workers (s(E) = 1).
Similarly, if U > S the median voter will be unskilled and, in order to
maximize the probability of winning, parties will try to obtain the vote of the
unskilled workers. Given a level of progressivity of the tax scheme , the highest
utility that a party can o¤er to unskilled worker is Uu(Eu(); ), that is, the
unskilled workersutility when the government implements the optimal level of
border enforcement for unskilled workers. Additionally, given a positive level of
border enforcement E, the highest utility that a party can o¤er to an unskilled
worker is Uu(E; 0), that is, the unskilled workersutility when the government
implements the optimal level of progressivity of the tax scheme for unskilled
workers (u(E) = 0)
Proposition 4 When parties choose both  and E simultaneously the unique
equilibrium outcome will be a tie: both parties win the election with probability
equal to 12 . Moreover, a pure strategy equilibrium will be [(E

s (1); 1); (E

s (1); 1)]
i¤ S > U and [(Eu(0); 0); (E

u(0); 0)]
10 i¤ U > S:
Proof. Since both parties are a priori identical if one of them chooses
(E;) such that it wins the election with probability 1 it could not be an
equilibrium because her opponent may choose the same (E;) and win the
election with probability 12 . Thus, if the outcome of the game is not a tie,
matching the opponent´s strategy is always a protable deviation for one of the
parties. Hence, the unique equilibrium outcome will be that both parties win
the election with probability equal to 12 .
10Notice that Eu(0) = Emax = Sws
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If S > U the party that o¤ers a pair (E;) such that the utility of skilled
workers is higher will win the election. Given a pair of values (E1; 1) with
1 < 1; party 2 can win the election with probability equal to 1 choosing
E2 = E1 and 2 > 1. Thus in equilibrium we must have both parties choosing
2 = 1 = 1.
Suppose that 2 = 1 = 1 and party 1 chooses E1 6= Es (1); then party 2
can win the election choosing E2 = Es (1). Thus, in equilibrium we must have
both parties choosing E1 = E2 = Es (1): Hence, [E

s (1); 1] has to be chosen by
both parties at equilibrium.
Similarly, we can prove that if U > S; then [(Eu(0); 0); (E

u(0); 0)] can be
sustained as an equilibrium.
4.2 Ideological Parties
We present now two scenarios in which parties are ideological. We consider
ideology as an strong preference on one of the policy instruments. First, we
suppose that parties ideology is determined by the progressivity of the tax
scheme and nally that it is determined by the intensity of protection against
illegal immigration.
4.2.1 PartiesIdeology determined by 
Suppose that the level of progressivity of the tax scheme is xed for both parties
(and di¤erent for di¤erent parties). We will denote by leftist party the party
which is committed to a higher level of progressivity of the tax scheme (l) and
rightist party the one committed to a lower level of progressivity (r > l).
Ideology can be interpreted in this game as the progressivity of tax schemes
o¤ered by parties. In this case parties only have to propose the level of border
enforcement. We can interpret this scenario to countries in which the immigra-
tion become an important issue recently and parties do not have an ideological
position yet on it.
If S > U , the median voter will be skilled and political parties will center
their proposals on skilled workers. Notice that the best that a party can do in
this case is to chose the optimal level of border enforcement for skilled workers,
given its own value of . That is Es (l) for the leftist party and E

s (r) for
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the rightist party. From Proposition 3 we know that dUs(E

s ();)
d > 0. Since
r > l, it implies that Us(Es (r); r) > U(E

s (l); l): Therefore, the rightist
party has a strategy that guarantees him a sure win.
Similarly if U > S, since dUu(E

u();)
d < 0 and r > l, we have that
Uu(E

u(l); l) > U(E

u(r); r). Therefore the leftist party can win the election
supporting Eu(l).
Those levels of border enforcement may constitute a particular pure strategy
equilibrium for each case. We calculate all the possible pure strategy Nash
equilibria of the game and we state them in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 Suppose l < r are xed and parties choose E:
(i) if S > U the rightist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strate-
gies Er 2 R+ s.t. Us(Er; r) > Us(Es (l); l) and the equilibrium outcome of
the election is rightist party wins the election with probability 1.
(ii) if U > S the leftist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strate-
gies El 2 R+ s.t. Uu(El; l) > Uu(Eu(r); r) and the equilibrium outcome of
the election is leftist party wins the election with probability 1.
Proof. If S > U the winner of the election is the party that o¤ers the level
of border enforcement that makes skilled workers better o¤. Then given a level
of progressivity of the tax scheme such that l < r,the best replies for each
party can be written as:
BRl =
8<: El 2 R+ s.t. Us(El; l) > Us(Er; r) if Er 2 R+ nKEl 2 R+ if Er 2 K
BRr = fEr 2 R+ s.t. Us(Er; r) > Us(El; l) for all El 2 R+g ;
whereK  fE 2 R+ s.t. Us(E;r) > Us(Es (l); l)g represents the set of dom-
inant strategies for the rightist party. It is no empty since Es (r) 2 K:
Then since, Us(E;r) > Us(E;l) for all E 2 R+ we have that if the
rightist party chooses a level of border enforcement Er 2 K then this party
will win the election with probability 1. Hence, [(El 2 R+); (Er 2 R+ s.t.
Us(Er; r) > Us(E

s (l); l))] are the pure strategy equilibria of the game and
the outcome of the election will be that the rightist party wins with probability
1.
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When U > S the proof is similar to the one written above.
Figure 1 represents the range of equilibrium values for the level of border
enforcement chosen by the rightist party when S > U .
Us
(E,?)
Us(
E,?
r)
Us(Es*
??
l
),?
l)
                                                                                               Us
(E,?
l)
                                                                Es*
??
l) E
                                   Equilibium levels of Er = K
Range of Equilibrium Levels of Er
To summarize, whenever Partiesideology is determined by , rightist party
has an advantage to capture skilled workersvote, and leftist party has an ad-
vantage to capture unskilled workersvote. Thus, the outcome of the election
is totally determined by the composition of the population.
4.2.2 PartiesIdeology determined by E
We will assume now that parties are committed to implement a specic border
enforcement policy. We denote by leftist party the party which is committed
to a lower level of border enforcement and rightist party the one committed
to a higher level of border enforcement (i.e. Er > El). Thus, ideology can
be interpreted in this game as the intensity of protection against immigration.
Assuming that the level of border enforcement is xed for parties they only have
to propose a level of progressivity of their tax schemes. We can interpret this
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scenario to countries in which the immigration become for some time an issue
and parties have already an ideological position on it.
If S > U the median voter will be a skilled worker and given a certain level
of border enforcement E, any political party will try to propose a value for  in
order to give skilled workers a level of utility higher than the one o¤ered by her
opponent. Since the level of border enforcement is given, the number of illegal
immigrants entering the country is also given. Thus, parties will want to o¤er
a value for  that minimizes the tax imposed to skilled workers.
Given a xed value of E , the optimal value of  for skilled workers is  = 1:
Thus, the maximal utility that party j can o¤er to skilled workers given a xed
value of Ej is Us(Ej ; 1): Then, if Us(El; 1) > Us(Er; 1) the leftist party has a
nonempty set of dominant strategies that guarantees her a sure victory (this set
will include l = 1). Otherwise if Us(Er; 1) > Us(El; 1) the rightist party has
a nonempty set of dominant strategies that guarantees her a sure victory (this
set will include r = 1). Finally, if Us(Er; 1) = Us(El; 1) then both parties can
assure a tie by choosing j = 1:
Notice that if both parties choose the value for  that minimizes the tax
imposed to skilled workers (i.e. j = 1) the rightist party will win the election
i¤ Us(Er; 1) > Us(El; 1). That is:
 (I (Y;Er)  I (Y;El))
Er   El >
ws
Uwu+Sws
s
(14)
We state the previous result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose Er > El are xed and parties choose  then if S > U
we have that the rightist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strategies
and the equilibrium outcome of the election is rightist party wins the election with
probability 1 i¤:
 (I (Y;Er)  I (Y;El))
Er   El >
ws
Uwu+Sws
s
The inequality written in the proposition is composed by two positive terms
since Er > El and IE(Y;E) < 0. The one in the left hand side represents
the impact of a change in border enforcement policy on the number of illegal
immigrants entering the country. That is the e¢ cacy of the border enforcement.
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The one in the right hand side represents the participation on the nancing
of the border enforcement policy for an skilled worker relative to her illegal
immigration marginal e¤ect when both parties propose the minimum level of
progressivity j = 1.
This Proposition shows that the e¢ cacy of border enforcement policy ( 4I(Y;E)4E )
matters. In particular, if e¢ cacy is higher enough rightist party surely wins
the election. However, since IEE(Y;E) > 0, e¢ cacy is decreasing on E which
means that the lower level of border enforcement committed to by both parties
the higher the probability of winning for the rightist party.
More comparative statics can be done. For instance, as skilled workers
negative concern about illegal immigration increases (higher values of s) skilled
workers will tend to vote for the rightist party and she will be more likely to win
the election. In this context, one can think that rightist parties might have an
interest to rise skilled workersnegative perception about illegal immigration.
Also, since IEY (Y;E) < 0, i.e. e¢ cacy of border enforcement is increasing
on the potential illegal immigration, a higher potential illegal immigration will
help rightist parties to win the election. Hence, rightist party is more likely to
win as the external threat is higher.
Similarly, if U > S, the median voter will be unskilled and given a certain
level of border enforcement Ej any party would choose a value of j in order
to give to unskilled workers a higher utility level than her opponent. As we
have seen above, since the level of illegal immigration is given parties will o¤er
a value of j in order to minimize the tax imposed to unskilled workers to fund
the given level of border enforcement.
In this case, given a xed value of E, the optimal value for the unskilled
workers is  = 0: Thus the maximal utility that party j can o¤er to unskilled
workers given a xed value of Ej is Uu(Ej ; 0): Then, if Uu(Er; 0) > Uu(El; 0)
the rightist party has a nonempty set of dominant strategies that guarantees her
a sure victory (this set will include l = 0). Otherwise if Uu(El; 0) > Uu(Er; 0)
the leftist party has a nonempty set of dominant strategies that guarantees her
a sure victory. Finally, if Uu(Er; 0) = Uu(El; 0) then both parties can assure a
tie by choosing j = 0.
We know that Uu(Er; 0) > Uu(El; 0) i¤:
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0 > u (I (Y;Er)  I (Y;El))
But this condition is always satised since Er > El and IE(Y;E) < 0. So,
we can conclude that the rightist party always wins the election choosing the
maximum level of progressivity of the tax scheme r = 0. We set this result on
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose Er > El are xed and parties choose  then if U > S
the rightist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strategies and the equi-
librium outcome of the election is rightist party wins the election with probability
1.
Proof. Since Ej is given we have that Uu(Ej ; j) is a decreasing function of
j . Thus, the maximal utility that party j can o¤er to unskilled workers given
a xed value of Ej is Uu(Ej ; 0): Given Er > El if both parties choose j = 0
we have that:
Uu(Er; 0)  Uu(El; 0) = u (I (Y;El)  I (Y;Er)) > 0
Therefore, the rightist party has a nonempty set of strictly dominant strate-
gies (which include r = 0) and the equilibrium outcome of the election is
rightist party wins the election with probability 1.
So, whenever partiesideology is determined by border protection, composi-
tion of the population does not entirely determine the outcome of the election.
More precisely, in countries in which there are more unskilled than skilled work-
ers rightist party has an advantage to capture the unskilled workersvote. So, in
this case, composition of the population determines the political outcome. How-
ever, in countries where there are more skilled than unskilled workers, skilled
workers will vote for the rightist party if their optimal level of border enforce-
ment is high enough. Thus, in this case, the outcome of the election does not
only depend on the composition of the population but also in some parameters
such as s or Y: So that, for values of s or Y large enough, rightist parties have
an advantage to win independently on the population structure of the country.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we ask ourselves whether ideology can be useful for parties to
win elections when the relevant issue is the control of immigration. In order
to answer this question we analyze di¤erent scenarios depending on whether
parties are either opportunistic or ideological. In addition, assuming ideological
parties, we consider di¤erent cases depending on whether ideology is either
determined by the level of border enforcement or by level of progressivity on
the tax scheme. Using a very simple two party competition model we nd the
following conclusions:
1. When parties are purely opportunistic, i.e. they can choose both E
and , in equilibrium, they always tie and choose the same pair of policies.
This equilibrium policies coincide with the optimal ones for the median voter.
However, when parties are ideological in equilibrium there is a unique winner
and the policies implemented may not be the optimal ones for the median voter.
Therefore, in general ideology gives a party an advantage to win the election.
2. If illegal immigration is a new phenomenon in the host country, i.e.
parties ideology is determined by , in equilibrium, the rightist party always
wins the election in developed countries (where the majority of population is
skilled) while the leftist party always wins in developing countries (where the
majority of population is unskilled). The intuition behind this result is that
voters will vote for the party who gives them a cheaper border enforcement.
Obviously, the rightist party (less progressive party) may o¤er a cheaper border
enforcement to skilled workers while leftist party (more progressive party) may
o¤er a cheaper border enforcement to unskilled workers. Thus if the median
voter is skilled the rightist party wins otherwise if the median voter is unskilled
the leftist party wins.
3. If illegal immigration has been an issue for some time in the host country,
i.e. parties ideology is determined by E, in equilibrium, the rightist party
always wins the election in developing countries (where the majority of the
population is unskilled). That is because political competition make parties
choose high levels of progressivity which implies that the optimal level of border
enforcement for the median voter (unskilled) will be also high. Therefore, the
most anti-immigrant party has an advantage to win the election.
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However, in developed countries (where the majority of the population is
skilled) the political outcome depends on other variables such as the skilled
workersperception about the relationship between illegal immigration and in-
security, and the e¢ cacy of the border enforcement policy. In this context, we
nd that if skilled workers believe more intensively that illegal immigration is
linked to delinquency and to insecurity, in equilibrium, the rightist party (the
most anti-immigrant party) wins more likely. In addition, we nd that as the
border enforcement policy is more e¢ cacious, in equilibrium, the rightist party
wins more likely. Both results seem to be quite intuitive since either a higher
e¤ect of illegal immigration on skilled workersutility or a high e¢ cacy of the
border enforcement make skilled workers (the majority of the population) prefer
a higher level of border enforcement.
4. In this context, with respect to the e¢ cacy of the border enforcement
we assume that it is increasing in the number of potential illegal immigrants.
Then, the higher the number of potential illegal immigrants the more likely the
rightist party wins the election in equilibrium.
5. Regarding the policy implications, in countries where illegal immigration
is a new phenomenon there is no policy implication because the composition
of population determines the political outcome. However, in countries where
illegal immigration is an old phenomenon we nd some policy implications. In
this type of countries we want to emphasize the conict of interests between the
rightist and leftist party about some aspects such as the concern that skilled
workers have about illegal immigration and the e¢ cacy of the border enforce-
ment policy. As far as our results are concerned a natural implication is that
the rightist party would have interests in rise the concern about illegal immigra-
tion among skilled workers and improve the e¢ cacy of the border enforcement
policy. Nevertheless, the leftist party would have interests in reduce the concern
about illegal immigration among skilled workers and lower the e¢ cacy of the
border enforcement policy.
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